Introduction:
welfare amenable to the kind of predictive logics that turn uncertainties into certain outcomes in order to insulate the company from the fickle fears of investors. This is part of a much older program of scenario forecasting within Anglo American dating back to the latter years of apartheid when the company controlled around 50 percent of the South African economy (Lester et al 2000: 188) . Surveying the post-apartheid future the company's team of horizon scanners and scenario planners attempted to provide a set of principles, a playbook as it were, for predicting and controlling the uncertain future (and sustaining their influence and wealth within it). According to these principles, business, indeed all of life, is best strategized as a game-much like the classic model of market rationality-complete with rules, players, winners, and losers. Today, the biggest "game" being played in South Africa, according to the company's chief forecaster, is HIV: "a catastrophic game," which, as he put it, combines "human tragedy with cold economics." * * * * * In 2004 when I started my research on the platinum belt, mining companies were riding high on soaring global metals prices. The Financial Times reported: "mining companies are generating so much cash at the moment due to high metals prices that it sometimes appears hard for them to know how to spend it" (Bream 2006) . At the centre of the platinum boom, was Rustenburg, the source of around half of the world's platinum. At the same time, the CSR movement was gaining ground daily, building momentum globally, and finding particular currency in South Africa as it incorporated the language of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) promising emancipation and social improvement through business, big and small. In South Africa, multinational corporations, with the mining industry at their helm, were lining up (or competing) to commit their resources, their know-how and their creative energies to social goods, from community education and empowerment initiatives, to HIV care and treatment programs.
As it turns out, CSR offered much more to companies than something to spend their own money on. It proved equally lucrative for them -enabling mining companies to leverage international donor funds, demonstrating the extent to which CSR in general was emerging as the new orthodoxy of development. In particular, the South African mining industry was being embraced as partner in building the new South Africa. In 2007 the International Finance Corporation gave Lonmin (owners of the Marikana mine) $5.9 million in technical assistance to upgrade worker housing and promote BEE, among other things (Lichtenstein 2012 ).
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Meanwhile in 2013, Anglo Zimele, Anglo American's empowerment arm which enables them to comply with BEE legislation, received funding from the Development Bank of South Africa, i.e. the state development bank, in order to support BEE start-ups (empowerment work which is construed as a demonstration of the corporate effort to "give back" to the nation). That same year, the UN Global Fund apportioned 80 percent of its country budget to fight malaria in Ghana, to Anglo Gold Ashanti (ICMM press release 2014 1 ), effectively channelling the bulk of Global Fund programming in the country to mineaffected areas while leaving a dearth elsewhere. Each of these cases represents the investment of public or donor funds and technical assistance to cover core operational costs such as worker health and housing which are nonetheless categorised as "externalities" in corporate speak. CSR, I argue, serves as a mechanism by which companies offload the financial burdens of their social obligations rather than internalizing them. This foreshadows a critical tension between responsibility and externalization that runs through this essay.
Four years on from the boom time of investment in minerals and social responsibility, and the picture looked very differently. Anglo American announced a 69 percent decline in profits to $1bn for the first half of the year (Smith 2009) . By the end of the year 11 percent of its global workforce was laid off in order to make up the $450 million in costs (Sparshott 2009) . A large proportion of the 19,000 retrenched Anglo employees were at Anglo Platinum which, according to trade unions, was responsible for a fifth of all recession-linked formal sector job losses in South Africa (Smith 2009 ). This amounts to ten thousand or so former employees at the platinum mines who were no longer eligible for company-sponsored ART or other benefits offered as part of the company's CSR to its workforce. In such a context of mass joblessness, "those with jobs," as Gumede puts it, "cling on to them, for fear they may never get one again" (Gumede 2012 ). Yet they are all the more vulnerable to the dictates of a volatile global market and the shibboleth of shareholder value invoked by corporate management as a rejoinder to their struggle for better conditions and a fairer wage. Cast as a facet of CSR, worker welfare is thus linked to shareholder value, contingent on the extreme vacillations in price to which the platinum market is subject (from $2000 an ounce in 2006 to $800 an ounce in 2008).
This essay is divided into four sections which explore both the kinds of control that are enabled through the corporate dispensation of worker welfare; the spatial and temporal limits to that exercise of responsibility; and the inequalities that these acts of delimitation and externalisation produce.
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In the first section I consider how worker welfare becomes a basis for governance; not the self-governance of corporations as is commonly expected, but governance of the workforce. As welfare is conflated with the maintenance of human capital, care becomes a conduit for corporate control giving new force to old paternalistic and repressive regimes of labor management which the advent of contemporary CSR had supposedly consigned to the past. From sport and leisure, to health and hygiene, and from safe sex to "feeding" science, HIV management is embedded within daily regimes that attempt to regulate the working and domestic lives of employees.
The second section moves on to consider the geographic demarcation of corporate responsibility. I examine how the new technologies of HIV management reinscribe boundaries demarcating the company's zone of responsibility, erecting a metaphysical "cordon-sanitaire" between the workplace and, what is described in corporate jargon as, "the world beyond our perimeter fence" (Anglo American 2005: 16) . Through the daily routines of HIV management, the company attempts to "make legible its subjects" (Scott 1998 : 2) and to protect the social fabric of its workforce-its human capital-from the physical infection, "moral contagion," and threat to productivity, brought on by "outsiders."
Section three explores how this spatialization of CSR creates liminal spaces between the company and what the WHO has termed "peri-mining communities". As increasing numbers of mineworkers opt to live outside the hostels-mostly in the informal settlements which sit cheek-by-jowl with the mining compounds-the distinction between workplace and society becomes increasingly anachronistic. Yet, I argue, it is the very permeability of the physical borders (across which movement was once more rigidly controlled) that has placed increasing importance on symbolic "moral" borders re-constructed, rather than dissolved, through the authoritarian benevolence of corporate care. Through the re-inscription of these borders the tension between welfare and profit emerges clearly.
As the final section of this essay shows, the circumscription of CSR not only imposes spatial boundaries, but it also establishes sharp temporal limits to welfare provision.
Measured against metrics of productivity, the corporate care program has become increasingly efficient at managing and maintaining the well being of mineworkers while they remain employed by the company. However, there are no reliable statistics accounting for health and well being of workers once they leave the company (whether due to sickness, sacking, or shaft closure). And while the state delivery of ART remains patchy and slow, especially in the traditional "labor-sending" areas to which many mineworkers return after their contracts are terminated, doctors at the mines remain pessimistic about whether a 6 continuum of care across the mine's perimeter is possible, let alone likely. The result is the emergence of a vanguard or island of ART recipients, employees who depend on the mine not only for their livelihoods, but also for their survival. They are thus divided from society outside the workplace and from their own dependents. Their liminality comes to embody the disjuncture between corporate responsibility and state welfare which translates into an awkward topography of authority and responsibility.
Human Care and Human Capital
In Anglo's 1987 forecasting, HIV had been identified as a "wild card" in the broader game of socio-economic transition (Sunter 1987) . This prediction was underwritten by a survey of 60,000 mineworkers conducted by the Chamber of Mines between 1986-7 showing 0.3 percent HIV prevalence among South African miners. The highest prevalence (around 4 percent) was among Malawian mineworkers (Randera 2003) . In response, the mining industry introduced pre-emptive testing for all foreign mineworkers: "no known carriers will be engaged [and] all recruits from high risk areas will be tested at source" (Brink and Clausen 1987: 15, emphasis added) . Such a response effectively externalised HIV as an extraneous risk encroaching on the borders of the workplace. Mining companies attempted to insulate themselves against this "threat" to productivity and profit by cutting off the supply of labour, and supposedly the infection, "at source."
The genealogy of this strategy can be traced back over half a century to apartheid discourse from the 1940s, perpetuated by the mine medical establishment and the government, located the source of tuberculosis epidemics at the mines in the physical and moral failure of mineworkers to make the transition from rural life in the homelands to industrial civilization at the mines or, as Packard puts it, from "healthy reserve" to "dressed native" (Packard 1989: 686) . Such pseudo-scientific claims provided support for the policy of "separate development" between the areas designated "native homelands" or "bantustans"
by the apartheid government and the state. The tenure of black mineworkers within the boundaries of the workplace was determined by their objectification as a productive resource.
Mamdani writes: "this meant, on the one hand the forced removal of those marked unproductive so they may be pushed out of white areas back into native homelands and, on the other, the forced straddling of those deemed productive between workplace and homeland through an ongoing cycle of annual migrations" (Mamdani 1996: 7) . The realities of impoverishment in the homelands, of households fragmented through migrant labor, and of the poor conditions of work and life at the mines, were glossed into an idealised myth of the "healthy reserve," to which mineworkers were expected to return when their contracts ended (Packard 1989: 11) . Such narratives externalized responsibility for both the cause and cost of occupational ill-health and welfare from employer to employee.
The industry's initial response after the 1986 HIV survey followed this same logic.
Just as mine medical officers in the 1940s had pursued a policy of swift "repatriation" of TB infected mineworkers once they became "unable to function" (Packard 1989: 692) , so in 1987, the Chamber of Mines instituted a similar policy for HIV positive miners. An article appeared in the Journal of the Mine Medical Officers' Association qualifying the industry's position: despite pre-emptive testing (which was later outlawed), mineworkers would not be "repatriated" if they were well enough to work, but would face "repatriation" when they became too sick to do so (Brink and Clausen 1987 These actuarial logics sustain a broader narrative of "shareholder value" that apparently provides proof of a bottom line to corporate humanitarianism. From this conflation of human care with human capital an unsettling combination of health-speak and accountancy-speak emerge which reduce the human "cost" of HIV to a ratio of payroll (in this case 3.4 percent).
An Anglo executive explained: "look the bottom line is… if you spend thousands of dollars training someone to drive a truck and they then die of AIDS, you have to train someone else" "now we start again with VCT." Last time I saw him he said, "Doc, we're up to 100%
VCT uptake"... Anglo Coal puts VCT targets into managers' performance ratings.
They measure their VCT uptake day by day. I can call him-I'll call him now and say "what is your VCT uptake for today?" (Interview with Dr Matthew Waywell 2 , Anglo
American Johannesburg, 2 June).
Waywell then turned to Rustenburg:
What you see there is a lack of commitment, lack of leadership… At Anglo Platinum they claim that HIV is 25% in their report, it should be 35%. Why don't they know?
Those section managers in Anglo Platinum need to be held accountable. Someone should put a rocket up their arse.
Waywell's recitation of the numbers tripped off his tongue, well-rehearsed after frequent interviews and public engagements. The same numbers were recited to me in interviews with executives in London and were presented at CSR conventions, compelling in their ability to demonstrate measurable success of the company's HIV interventions in terms of a quantifiable output. Such metrics of efficiency (the numbers of workers in VCT, on ART, and back at work) impose a profit and loss logic which did not go uncontested within the company. For those such as Bridget Kessler and Elias Makoe, who worked on the "social" as opposed to the "medical" side of HIV planning within Anglo subsidiaries, the preoccupation with "numbers," as Kessler put it, was indicative both of the technocratic and production-focused culture of mining companies, and the dominance of a traditionally biomedical approach to worker health:
The whole HIV issue has been melted down to two figures-how many workers have had VCT and how many are on ART. We have meetings with our counterparts in As Moody-Stuart's statement indicates, the elevation of multinationals in the fight against HIV (celebrated by bodies such as the UN and WHO) goes beyond a question of delivery. As he underlines, it is the extension of market logic itself into the realm of worker healthcare (and public health more broadly) that is fast becoming orthodoxy.
Yet the notion of "enlightened self-interest"-which instrumentalizes CSR as a mechanism to safeguard human capital-recalls a much older logic. As Marks reminds us, "concern for the lives and limbs of... workers" is far from new (Marks 2006: 570) . Health management in the workplace traditionally combined a paternalistic ethos with a Taylorist order which attempted to maintain living labor capacity by eliminating threats to low output (Crisp 1983: 104) . This logic found concrete expression in the establishment of the Ernest
Oppenheimer hospital at the Welkom gold mines in the 1950s; a model of both modern medicine and progressive mine management, according to its first director, Dr JHG Blommestein:
This was an era in which there still survived an idée fixe… that workers were just hands… that expenditure not directly relevant to profit must be kept at a minimum.
However, the winds of change blew… directors and managers began to realize that every day lost by a sick or injured man adds to the cost of production (van By presenting risk and responsibility as two sides of the same coin, the dominant corporate discourse serves to externalize HIV as a social risk or threat to profit from which business must insulate itself. Executives stressed that while the company offered a solution to the crisis in the areas where they operate, the source of the problem lay outside the company's domain of the company, extraneous to the business of mining. The chairman explained: "there are also things in the country happening which have an impact on the operations, such as... crime, HIV… conflict, things which are not caused by the company but impinge on it… This is not our fault, but we're getting zapped by it" (Interview with Anglo
American Chairman, London 6 December 2005). As I explore in the following section, this tension between externalization and responsibility plays out in the routines of care and the demarcation of moral space around the mines, delimiting the boundaries of corporate responsibility to their zone of interest: the workplace and the workforce.
Geographies of Care and Control
As Steyn, hostel coordinator at Anglo Platinum's Rustenburg Section, was to insist the hostels are much changed from those described by Wilson as "labour batteries" (Wilson 1972 ): "now the company cares about their (miners') health… we are more socially responsible" (Interview with Hostel Coordinator, Rustenburg 25 May 2005). Yet, despite the directives of the Mining Charter, and pressure from the National Union of Mines (NUM), to "upgrade" the hostels to apartments with single rooms and family units, the accommodation provided by the mine to lower-ranking employees remains one in which a resident is "expected to live as a 'bachelor… until he returns 'home' to visit his wife and children" (Ramphele 1993: 20) . From the physical space of the hostels, to the involvement of the company in the personal lives of mineworkers, the hostel is an encompassing institution which circumscribes the interaction between occupants and those outside. The figure of the hostel manager embodies this merging of public and private. Like most of the hostel managers I talked to, Kobus, manager of Hostel A (one of Anglo Platinum's Rustenburg hostels), spoke about his role in terms of affectionate paternalism-a combination of welfare managerialism and discipline. He described his commitment to "protect his men," and his efforts to "educate those who aren't infected" and to "look after those who are." He added,
"we want to make it clear that we will take care of people and they shouldn't go to the informal settlements where it's not safe." ( Steyn, the coordinator, replied: "we can track the food groups and check they're eating right in the hostels. If they live in the informal settlements we can't feed them well." The contrast between the hostels, cast as a healthy environment in which employees are "looked after", and the informal settlements was constantly reinforced. Bruno, another hostel manager, was concerned that residents were likely selling their portions of Morvite: "I've seen kids running around the squatter camps with… Morvite-where else could they be getting them from?
This means that I have men in the hostel… that aren't getting their supplements and it's costing us money." Steyn put up the most recent cost and nutritional analyses of "feeding returns" at each hostel, noting that at Hostel B the proteins were lower: "you should be giving them 270 and you're only giving them 257." Jurie, Hostel B's manager, explained that his "feeding budget" was inadequate to meeting the new nutritional requirements of Palladium.
Steyn responded that the budgets were calculated precisely according to the number of hostel The committee looked at how many pounds of maize meal, salt, beans, and meat the Railway and the Public Works Department gave their workers; the Government Biochemist said this was not enough, and the "Biochemist's Diet" entered the lexicon of scientific wage determination (Cooper 1987: 65) .
Just as Steyn and his colleagues were concerned that mineworkers who live outside the hostels would not "feed themselves properly," so Cooper notes that the 1942 committee on malnutrition and industry reported that the diets of dock workers "do not provide the resistance to disease and the essential alertness which Government should expect from its servants" (quoted in Cooper 1987: 60) .
The imperative to encourage mineworkers to stay in the hostels (and out of the informal settlements) similarly provided the rationale for the promotion of sport. And once again, these discussions recall the paternalistic ideals of Victorian industrialists and their prescriptions for the moral upliftment of their workers through physical endeavor, underpinned by a vision of muscular Christianity. At the Rustenburg mines it was the job of the Welfare Officers to promote and organize sports in the hostels, and who, as a consequence, were the subject of debate at the hostel meeting:
Bruno:
In the new system, the welfare officers have been demoted to level 5-you can't do that to these guys… They're working really hard to look As Steyn's final comment highlights, there was a sense in which everything targeted at managing HIV was, at least in theory, was calculable. Inputs (such as "feeding returns," the number of residents recruited to football, or the number of free condoms given out each month) were weighed against outputs, measured by the HIV prevalence rate, the numbers of employees in VCT, and on ART. Circle of Hope guidelines instructed that "peer educators must keep good records…statistics should include the number of people reached, the number of condoms distributed? (Anglo Platinum 2003a: 39) . Benjamin, an underground mineworker, peer-educator, and Hostel A's champion long-distance runner, told me: "I think the message is getting through, last month we gave out 18,000 condoms… in the hostel in just one month." These measurements recorded by peer-educators, VCT counsellors and the mine medical staff, and reported to corporate HQ, feed into broader analyses of the cost benefit of HIV management, demonstrating the capital saved in increased productivity.
As Kobus took me around his hostel, he stressed the commitment to cleanliness throughout the institution. In the spotless industrial kitchen, he said: "we don't have… infections here, it's kept very, very clean... The hostels are not the way they used to be- humans and valuing human capital. The logic of enlightened self-interest casts labor as a facet of production, conflating social responsibility with the desire to maintain productive efficiency and thus glossing the tension between them. By framing ART as a benefit, provided free of charge by the company to its employees, a perception is generated that, as Toby Zwick of the Chamber of Mines put it, "I am being looked after and I am apparently not paying for it."
Responsibility and Externalization
Circle of Hope's HIV prevention plan set out to map the "community," beyond the perimeter fence through a "sexually transmitted infection surveillance programme" within a 10km distance. The aim was to create an economic risk profile of the pandemic, by targeting "female commercial sex workers (and) female partners of male attendees" (Anglo Platinum 2003b: 16). The map depicts the hostels at the centre, surrounded by informal settlements marked "high risk areas for transmission for STIs" and "divided into discrete, manageable zones" (ibid). The desire for sharp boundaries (arguably a product of the cartographic tendencies of an extractive company) cleanses this map of the intricate social relations that straddle the workplace and the informal settlements.
As Scott observes, the process of demarcation, classification, and rationalization not only enables the state and, in this case the company, to "get a handle on its subjects" (Scott 1998 : 2), but also to "remake" social realities in its image. The great advantage of such tunnel vision is that it brings into sharp focus specific elements of a "far more complex and unwieldy reality"; making it amenable to control, and isolating the "slice of social life" that is of interest to the observer, in this case, Anglo Platinum (Scott 1998: 11) . It does so by aiming its interventions at particular targets; making them distinct from those who are not in its line of vision or interest; and thereby territorializing the company's responsibility. And yet, in spite of the mapping, profiling, and routine surveillance, the corporate panopticon is limited in its capacity both to see and organize the workforce and to insulate it from so-called "externalities," which remain illegible. Cooper tells us that the colonial state strove to "preserve the infant urban working class from the contagions of the idle, the criminal, and the rural". But its efforts resulted in a more fragmented workforce, "but not in a purified city" (Cooper 1987: 181) . The same could be said of the company's workplace HIV intervention. Employees who voluntarily subscribe to the company's Platinum Health Insurance scheme receive benefits (including ART) for their spouses. But few can afford to do so. Dr.
McAllister estimated the number of subscriptions as "at most 5000 out of 25,000 and… most of those will be in the higher grades." The company's 2006 Report to Society stated that, "the majority of employees choose to rely on the national health system for the health care of their families" (emphasis added). But the report goes on to acknowledge that this source of health care is, in reality, unreliable. "Although ART is available in this setting, waiting times are long and service provision is patchy" (Anglo American 2006: 27) . Clara Xorile, a psychologist at Rustenburg mines, suggested this was not a matter of choice: the cost was prohibitive for most miners, while the scheme failed to acknowledge the physical distance between migrants and their families who are excluded from the mine's welfare community.
This makes the demarcation of corporate responsibility easier: "for many their (the miners') wives are in the rural areas so we don't even come into contact with them" (Interview, Rustenburg, 9 April 2005).
The exclusionary gaze of the company on its human capital, thus rendered the dependents of mineworkers invisible to the exercise of CSR, even where it extends into the intimate realm of personal relations and sexuality. However it is not purely, nor chiefly, the geographical distance that facilitates this displacement of the social responsibilities and costs of the mining industry onto poor rural households, and enables this century-long denial of the social worlds of migrant miners beyond the hostel. In many cases the separation between mineworkers and their dependents is not marked by physical distance. Where dependents live in the informal settlements just outside the hostels they remain equally outside the figurative boundary of responsibility that conforms to the contours of the perimeter fence. In 2008 the company announced its intention to extend ART to dependents (Anglo American 2008: 30 ).
This poses a major practical challenge in relation to tracking dependents back to so-called "remote areas" (ibid), highlighting the geographical and discursive border between the company and the world outside. It also raises questions about who the company will categorise as dependents, and whether this will incorporate or further marginalize those who live close by in the informal settlements, but who subvert the classic profile of the migrant miner's rural home life.
At its most basic level, the reality that is expunged from this corporate vision is migrancy itself embodied in the figure of the rock driller. Rock drillers, who make up the bulk of the underground workforce, are the lowest rank of the industry's Patterson salary scale. They are the ones literally at the platinum face, drilling into the unpredictable seams where they face the immediate threat of rock falls and injury, the short-term health risks of TB, which is perfectly incubated in the humid conditions underground, and the long-term health risks of silicosis. Deemed an anachronism, a vestige of the old South Africa who do not fit the storyline of the new South Africa they have been all but excised from the hegemonic narrative of empowered entrepreneurial citizens pursuing the dream of upward mobility. In its effort to demarcate zones of protection and wellness, the spatialization of corporate care stands in stark contrast to the constant peril and exposure to ill health that defines the working life of miners, and rock drillers in particular (Phakathi 2013) . Within this meta-narrative of denial, the material reality of migrant life continues to be externalized from the framework of CSR, and the simple fact (which remains unacknowledged by the mines' housing services) that if a miner is supporting a family in the Eastern Cape or Lesotho the living out allowance of around R1,800 is barely enough to rent a shack in the squatter camps. In the past the mine would supply a concrete "bed" and meals. Workers could send home to the rural areas most of their pay… [Now] on our small wages we have to pay for our own beds and meals. Many workers now have two families here and back home (union shop steward, quoted in Mapaila 2012).
As increasing aspects of social welfare are dispensed by non-state entities through exclusionary and narrowly targeted processes of corporate care to specific constituencies, it is not purely capital that can be credited with creating such fragmentation and inequity. It is the administration of welfare itself that serves to divide and rule. The outcome is two mutually dependent yet seemingly antithetical dimensions of the janus-faced corporate form-the one asserting responsibility for worker care and welfare in the very same moment that the other externalizes it. In the former we see a corporate paternalism over the company's direct human capital (i.e. its permanent workforce) reminiscent of colonial and apartheid regimes of total control. In the latter we see, the benefits extended through CSR to be highly exclusionary, reserved only for that shrinking portion of the workforce that the corporation claims as its own, while rendering subcontractors and dependents, as ineligible. McAllister was even more explicit about this "hand-over to nothing:"
Temporalities of
When workers leave the employment of the mine we write a very nice letter detailing the status of the patient, his CD-4 Count … "this person is on such and such a combination"… and it goes to a sister in a little rural clinic in the Eastern Cape… and then it stops. It's a hand-over to nothing.
With the high turnover of staff in the lower grades of mine employment (one shaft manager put it close to 100 percent turnover in five years), the hope, according to McAllister, is that "sometimes treatment will be picked up by other work places if they've moved jobs. Unless of course they're too sick to work," he added. There is little doubt that in the context of the current economic downturn, that few retrenched Anglo employees will be in a position to find a permanent job at another mining company that offers the benefits of a workplace HIV wellness program, making the chance of a "continuum of care" slim at best.
Yet, while most of the mine's medical staff acknowledged the difficulties of ensuring uninterrupted compliance to a drug regime, given job insecurity in the mining industry, few spoke explicitly about the concerns this raised for multi-drug resistance. Concern was however expressed by Gilbert Mogapi, an Anglo Platinum socio-economic development officer at the Rustenburg mines:
Once it is rolled out, the service cannot be interrupted. Once you start with ART you can't discontinue it, if you come off it for a month, you cannot go back on because of the danger of multi-drug resistant strains. Even in places where the rollout is the most advanced, like in Gauteng or the Western Cape, you might wait 6 months on a list. In rural areas in the Eastern Cape, it's virtually non-existent.
Dr. van Zyl dismissed such fears. It was precisely the expectation that (in spite of the company's efforts) few employees would in fact find treatment elsewhere after leaving the Anglo care program that allayed concerns about multi-drug resistance:
If you have a quick, clean cut then it'll be ok. If you completely suppress it, it's fine, and if you don't suppress it at all, it's fine-well not for them-but fine in terms of mutant strains. It's if you partially suppress it, or come off and on sporadically, that you get escaped mutants and that has severe epidemiological consequences. Also remember that, at this point, the number of people in the company on ART is still pretty small because VCT uptake has been slow.
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A number of issues emerge in light of van Zyl's observations. He was firm on the company's policy to mitigate the risk of multi-drug resistance by demanding either full compliance or complete termination of treatment because of the "serious epidemiological consequences" of partial suppression or sporadic treatment. At the same time, he, like
McAllister, had made it clear that the likelihood that workers who were dismissed would find alternative sources of ART was at best unpredictable, and thus there was no way of knowing the treatment regimen of former employees would be once they left the Anglo medical system. Van Zyl further suggested that the risk of multi-drug resistance was minimized, as the cohort of Anglo Platinum workers on ART was "still pretty small." However the commitment to increasing participation in VCT and enrolment in the wellness program demonstrates the hope that numbers would grow significantly over the coming years. As
Farmer argues multi-drug resistance should be viewed as the product of particular political and social relations (Farmer 1997: 348) . In this case, fears of multi-drug resistance are revealing of the limits of corporate care, and the disjuncture between a corporate HIV intervention and state provision. This challenges the dominant projection of the company's HIV intervention as a moral and political stand against the ineptitude of government. In practice, the corporate care program reflects instead the particular interests of the company:
to maintain worker health as long as employees are within the spatial confines of the workplace, the structural confines of the Anglo system, and, crucially, as long as they are economically productive.
The enduring terminology of mineworker "repatriation," in both official company HIV policy and in the everyday discourse of medical personnel and hostel managers, was striking: an artefact of colonial and apartheid-era labor regimes that endured during the course of almost a century. Yet, apartheid-era "influx controls," which restricted the movement of black workers between the dually constructed worlds of "homeland" and workplace were dismantled almost thirty years ago. Still, the discursive separation of the mine from broader society remains a significant element in understanding how contemporary discourses of HIV management at the mines reinscribe spatial, moral, and political boundaries between the workplace and society.
Conclusion: Expectations of Paternalism
Despite (or perhaps because of) its emphasis on scenario forecasting, Anglo Platinum's future vision of worker care is myopic. For it is premised on a denial or obfuscation of the effects of corporate welfare dispensation beyond the workplace; outcomes that may be deferred by CSR, 22 but become all the more inevitable. In the end, this brings home how perilous and exclusionary this new social-moral contract is, premised as it is on corporate patronage that is simultaneously coercive and fickle, for it can be extended or withdrawn at will (Rajak 2011 ).
This was captured in the most visceral way in the aftermath of the Marikana Massacre of 34 striking rock drillers on the platinum belt in 2012 and the wave of strikes that paralyzed the industry following the killings. In the second year of the strikes, in a bid to get rock drillers back to work, Anglo American closed the hostel kitchens where a great many miners, even those who do not live in the hostels, survive on one meal a day. This single act brought into sharp focus the violence of corporate responsibility as an instrument of benevolent tyranny (or tyrannical benevolence?) that enables companies to give and withhold benefits as techniques of control used in undermining worker agency. The Marikana Massacre and its aftermath has reaffirmed that CSR has the peculiar capacity to dehumanize even as it claims an ethic of care.
This form of corporate welfare turns humans into human capital, a productive resource to be nurtured, controlled or repressed through the provision or withholding of even the most basic welfare and social goods, in this case food. forms of patronage and clientelism both on and around the mines (Moodie 1994; Carstens 2001) , they are now both more exclusive and more contingent than the total and comprehensive paternalism once so characteristic of the Southern African minescape.
As James Ferguson makes clear, such "declarations of dependence"-which in this case look to the self-styled corporate sponsors of welfare and empowerment rather than the state-should be seen as an activist mode of claim-making, rather than a "retrograde yearning for paternalism" (Ferguson 2013: 223) . After all, if corporations such as Anglo are to be taken seriously in their declarations of corporate social responsibility, it stands to reason that workers (as well as those who live tantalizingly close to the benefits extended through CSR) must try to compel companies to make good on their promise to take care of them, by whatever means they can.
